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ARGUING THE LAW IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
Monroe H. Freedman*
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., has made significant contributions to the field of lawyer's ethics.' His Sibley Lecture, Arguing
the Law: The Advocate's Duty and Opportunity,2 however, falls
short of Professor Hazard's own best work, the quality of other
Sibley Lectures,3 and even the standard of advocacy that he postulates in his lecture.
Professor Hazard makes three principal points. First, there is
"strong reason to believe that the state of present advocacy is
4
pretty bad, and that it has not been a lot better in the past."1
Second, the advocate has, and should have, a professional obligation,
enforced by disciplinary rules and penalties, to cite authorities that
have been overlooked by opposing counsel and that are harmful to
one's own client.5 Third, it is always tactically advantageous to
concede the weaknesses of one's own case;" thus, "the chances of
victory can be improved by frank dealing with the law, adverse as
well as favorable." 7
The oddest thing about Professor Hazard's lecture is that it does
not comport with the very strictures that he would impose upon
the advocate. If a legal question is not genuinely arguable, he tells
* Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School Author, LAwYvs'
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2 E.g., G. HAZARD, ETHics IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw (1978).

2 Hazard, Arguing the Law: The Advocate's Duty and Opportunity, 16 GA. L Rev. 821
(1982).
3E.g., Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. Ray. 795
(1981); Ginsburg, Inviting JudicialActivism: A "Liberal"or "Conservative" Technique?, 15
GA. L. REv. 539 (1981); McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L.
R . 241 (1981).
Hazard, supra note 2, at 823. Professor Hazard devotes about one.third of his lecture to
circumstantial and anecdotal evidence in support of that conventional wisdom.
5 Id. at 825-29.
6 Id. at 830.
7Id. at 829.
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us, there is no point in litigating it; conversely, if a legal question is
indeed genuinely arguable, one must acknowledge the existence
and the strength of a contrary view.8
On that standard, Professor Hazard's lecture was hardly worth
delivering, for he cites no contrary authority, and he acknowledges
no strength in a thesis contrary to his own.9 Criticism of his view,
he says, derives from ignorance, 10 or from the simple-minded notion that "an advocate should cite only favorable authority"1 1
(which, of course, is not the issue), or from a failure to comprehend
strategic logic because of a blinding fear of candidly examining the
legal uncertainty of one's own position. 2 Thus, disagreement with
Professor Hazard's position derives from ignorance, stupidity, and
irrational fear-or so says the scholar who counsels the advocate to
eschew "tendentious argument" and "verbal assault."1 3
In fact, there are citations and arguments, adverse to Professor
14
Hazard's thesis, that he has not acknowledged in his lecture.
Harold Leventhal was a judge widely admired for his wisdom
and moderation. He was also a respected advocate. While a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Leventhal reflected on his earlier experience
in the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States. "Engraven in my memory," he said, "is an incident that concerns the
problem whether a lawyer should cite adverse precedents.",
While he was in the Solicitor's Office, Judge Leventhal related,
he had occasion to work on a Government brief in a case relating
to the interpretation of naturalization treaties.1 7 Relevant to that
issue were State Department rulings that fell into two distinct
lines of authority, one line supporting the Government's position,
Id. at 830.
Professor Hazard states the opposing arguments in two inadequate sentences, just after
characterizing them as "splenetic." Id. at 826.
'

:0 Id. at 827.

Id. (emphasis added).
2

Id. at 829.

IS Id.

at 831.
Since I have been asked for an informal comment with few citations, I have not
researched the issue thoroughly, but have relied only on materials ready at hand.
"SSee Leventhal, What the Court Expects of the Federal Lawyer, 27 FED. B.J. 1, 4-5
(1967).
10 Id. at 3.
7 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
"4
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the other contrary to it. Those rulings contrary to the Government's position were readily distinguishable, because all but one
arose in cases that did not involve naturalization. That one ruling,
however, had been missed both by opposing counsel and by the
court below.
The Assistant Legal Adviser of the State Department urged that
the inconsistent ruling be omitted from the Government's brief
before the Supreme Court. Judge Leventhal was adamant about
keeping it in his brief, however, along with a "suitable explanation" of why, properly understood, it did not undercut the Government's argument. The Supreme Court held against the Government, "not only [using] the citation but [featuring] it," and
expressly rejecting the Government's attempt to explain it away.28
Then came Judge Leventhal's judgment, based upon careful reflection: "I have thought about this many times. In all candor, I
would say that as a counsel in private practice I might not have
volunteered adverse references. But I do hope that Government
counsel will continue to do as I did as Government counsel in that
19
case."
Judge Leventhal wrote that in 1967, just before the 1969 promulgation of the present Model Code of Professional Responsibility and DR 7-106(B)(1). From 1949 until 1969, however, the official
position of the ABA had been significantly stricter than that in the
present Code. The ABA required the advocate to apply the following test in every case: Is the decision that opposing counsel has
overlooked one "which the court should obviously consider in deciding the case"? 2 0 Obviously, Judge Leventhal, having thought
about the issue many times, tended to disagree with the official
ABA view regarding the obligation of private counsel.
So too did the ABA itself when it subsequently adopted the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rule 7106(B)(1) is so narrow as to be wholly ineffectual. First, the requirement of disclosure relates only to legal authority "in the controlling jurisdiction." Second, the legal authority must be "directly
adverse" to the position of the lawyer's client. Most important, the
legal authority in question must be "known to [the lawyer] to be
18Leventhal, supra note 15, at 4.
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 280 (1957).
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directly adverse" to the client's position. Further, that subjective
knowledge requirement21 is in the context of a code that tells the
advocate to resolve any doubts about the law in favor of the
client.22
It will be the infrequent case in which it can be shown that adverse authority was in fact known to the lawyer; it will be the extraordinary case in which it can also be established that the lawyer, while resolving doubts in favor of the client, knew the legal
authority to be directly adverse. For example, Judge Leventhal
knew about the adverse authority, but is it clear that the adverse
authority was "known to him to be directly adverse"? After all, he
was able to provide the court with a "suitable explanation" that
the case was not in fact inconsistent with the Government's position. Assuming that his argument to the Supreme Court was made
in good faith, did he then "know" that the authority was "directly"
adverse to his argument?
Consider how Professor Hazard expresses the lawyer's duty. The
advocate is to cite adverse authority, but that means only "having
to think why and how that authority can be distinguished or otherwise neutralized." 23 If the authority is indeed capable of being distinguished or neutralized, however, then it cannot be "directly" adverse. Certainly, at least, legal authority cannot be "known to [the
lawyer who distinguished it] to be directly adverse" if the lawyer
can make a good faith argument that the authority is inapplicable
to the case.
Professor Hazard acknowledges that there is "some difference"
between the language of the present Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and that of the initial discussion draft regarding the
duty to divulge adverse authority. Comparing the two provisions,
however, Professor Hazard concludes that "[t]he important fact is
that only a small difference was involved" between the present DR

" The way in which standards of "knowing" are used in the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, sometimes disingenuously, sometimes erratically, is discussed in M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM ch. 5 (1975). For a discussion of the same
problem in the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1981), see AMmu.
CAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT

introductory comment on "knowing" (Reporter's Draft

1981).
22 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

'S Hazard, supra note 2, at 828.

EC 7-3 (1979).
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7-106(B)(1) and proposed rule 3.1(c).2' That conclusion is incorrect, or at least arguable.
As we have seen, DR 7-106(B)(1) is virtually meaningless; I
doubt that there has been a single disciplinary action under it,
anywhere, in the dozen years since it was adopted.2 5 Proposed rule
3.1(c), on the other hand, would have extended beyond authority
that is directly adverse, and embraced any legal authority "that
would probably have a substantial effect on the determination of a
material issue." I submit that lawyers who see a major difference
between those phrases are not being irrational. Most important,
there would no longer be a need to show that the lawyer knew the
authority to be directly adverse. Thus, even if the lawyer could
venture a good faith argument that the authority was not adverse,
it might still be said that the authority would "probably have a
substantial effect" on the court's consideration of the case. Contrary to Professor Hazard, therefore, proposed model rule 3.1(c)
might indeed have imposed a new burden on the advocate.
The question remains whether such a requirement is inconsistent with the advocate's role-or, at least, whether there are any
legal authorities and arguments in support of that proposition that
were omitted by Professor Hazard.
One authority, already noted, is Judge Leventhal's position. An
argument, also noted, is that the present rule, DR 7-106(B)(1), has
obviously been drafted in such a way as to make it ineffectual in
practice; however, the previous rule was broader, easier to enforce,
and much closer to the proposed model rule 3.1(c). One inference,
therefore, is that the bar has chosen to maintain the appearance of
such a requirement but not the substance. In addition, a 1972 survey of the District of Columbia Bar found that 93 out of 100 lawyers would not disclose adverse authority that was not cited by opposing counsel, while only 7 out of 100 would do 80.20 We need not
find such statistics conclusive on our judgments of lawyers' ethics,
but surely it would be arrogant to consider such a heavy preponderance of professional viewpoint to be wholly irrelevant.
I would suggest further that proposed model rule 3.1(c), had it

24

Id. at 827.
Professor Hazard characterizes the rule as "rarely operative" and at variance with pre-

vailing practice." Id. at 828.

" Friedman, ProfessionalResponsibility in D.C.: A Survey, 1972 Rzs Im Loqurrm 60.
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been adopted, would have placed the advocate in a conflict of interest that is inconsistent with the zealous representation of the
client required by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
under Canon 7 and with the undivided loyalty to the client required by Canon 5. As stated in EC 5-1, "The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised . . . solely for the benefit of
his client . . . ." Moreover, as an advocate, I am directed by the
Code to resolve any doubts about the law in favor of my client.2 7
Under my reading of the rules, therefore, writing a brief that is
harmful to my client is inconsistent with the fidelity and zealousness to which my client is entitled. Professor Hazard probably disagrees. Since he did not cite or discuss Canons 5 and 7, however,
we cannot be sure; he might simply have overlooked their relevance to the issue of the advocate's duty in arguing the law.
Before concluding, let me say that I agree with Professor Hazard
to the extent that frequently it is tactically desirable for the lawyer to cite and refute uncited authorities that are arguably adverse.
Even if opposing counsel has overlooked the adverse authority, the
court (or the judge's law clerk) might find it after briefs and arguments have been submitted. I do not believe, however, that it is or
should be ethically required that the advocate do so.
My ultimate point, though, is that the best and most appropriate
assurance that adverse authorities and arguments will come out is
the adversary system itself. This is not to say that the adversary
system is flawless. For example, my casebook on Contracts2 8 includes materials selected specifically to alert the student to the
fact that the adversary system will occasionally fail to bring out
facts or arguments that might be highly relevant to the court's deillustration is Davis v. Jacoby,3 0 where the contest
cision. 29 One m
was between parties claiming under a will and parties claiming
under a contract to make a different will. A material fact was that
the testator/contractor was very likely incompetent during the period of time when both instruments were executed. Accordingly,
neither party appears to have argued the legal relevance of the tes27

28

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1979).
M. FREEDMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (1973).
Id. at 7, 364-71, 608-14; see also M. FREEDMAN & A. RESNICK, TEACHER'S MANUAL

7-8,
2
185-258 (1978); Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Civil Practitioner: Teaching
Legal Ethics in the Contracts Course, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 569, 572 (1969).
30 1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934), reprinted in M. FREEDMAN, supra note 28, at 364.
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tator/contractor's mental condition, one side because they did not
want to impeach the will, the other side because they did not want
to impeach the contract.31
Despite occasional lapses of that sort, I am persuaded that the
adversary system is successfully designed to encourage each side of
a legal dispute to search out and to present to the court the relevant facts, law, and policy considerations bearing upon matters in
dispute. Professor Hazard's Article and this one illustrate my point
in a significant way with regard to the presentation of adverse authorities and arguments. Compare the inadequate exposition of
one who favors the compelled citation of adverse authority-Professor Hazard himself 32-with the adversary exposition
provided by our two papers together. Moreover, I trust that Professor Hazard's response to my adversary presentation will serve
not only to refute my arguments, but also to supplement and improve upon his original Sibley Lecture-all to the benefit of anyone attempting to resolve the issue.
In short, the adversary systems lives. And it works.

-11I wonder. would Professor Hazard really favor disciplinary action against the lawyers
for both sides in Davis o. Jacoby?

The comments to the Model Rules make several serious misstatements and omissions
of legal authorities. The New York State Bar Association has noted the irony that some of
the most egregious of those misstatements and omissions are in the comment to Rule 3.3,

which forbids the lawyer to misstate or to omit legal authorities. NYSBA, REPORT oF =H
SpzCLcL CoMMrrrza To Rvimw ABA DRAFT MODEL RuLEs OF PROFSSIONAL CoNDUcr 8 L6
(1981).

